Donald Trump’s election has brought the fears of Ukraine and its European and American supporters to fruition.
The incoming president and many of his nominated cabinet have expressed deep doubts about the war, openly questioned Washington’s support and open-ended commitment to Kyiv, and intimated that change was both necessary and forthcoming. What that change looks like is, as of this writing, unknown, but the auguries suggest a slowing or ending of aid and the pursuit of a resolution with or without Kyiv’s involvement.
Waiting to see what that policy becomes is untenable. Ukraine’s supporters in the U.S. and Europe need to get ahead of the political curve and recalibrate the message to both the incoming administration and the American public. This necessitates a sustained effort — the United Kingdom did not convince the Roosevelt administration why it should support London and Europe against Hitler’s Germany with one reception or one op-ed in a broadsheet.
The key for Trump, as in the Second World War, is how support for Ukraine is sold. The arguments and narratives about the war (and America’s role in the world) implicitly understood and shared by the Biden administration are not those of Trump and his closest advisors. Rather than attempt to convert these officials to true believers, Ukraine’s supporters should lean into Trump’s proclivities and self-image.
Trump sees himself as a businessman and dealmaker, and this should be embraced, not fought against. The only thing the incoming president hates more than no deal is a bad deal for him.
Any deal with Vladimir Putin — one which could well exclude the Ukrainians themselves — would be a bad deal and not worth the paper on which it is printed. A temporary respite or pause would only increase the longer-term costs of resolving this conflict. Ukraine’s allies need to lean into this reality.
A Ukrainian collapse needs to be presented as potentially Trump’s Afghanistan circa August 2021 but without the bombast. Trump hates losing, and the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan is rightly viewed both by himself and the American people as a failure. Portraying a Ukrainian collapse or the collapse of continental resolve in a similar light is one way to communicate to Trump the gravity of the situation.
Equally, America’s European allies need to better directly connect continental stability with continental economic productivity and, therefore, American prosperity. The disconnect between security and economics, afforded by the relative — hitherto — peace in Europe, has manifested in questions about America’s commitments across the Atlantic vividly illustrated in Trump’s candidacy and campaign.
At the same time, America’s European allies need to clearly, and simply, demonstrate what they are doing for their own security and defense to both the president and the new Congress. Ukraine and European security are inextricably linked and showing progress on the latter will make supporting the former, arguably, easier, or at least less costly.
Of the 32 NATO member-states, 23 now meet the 2 percent of GDP spending obligations. That is no longer enough and should be the sub-floor, not the floor. Meeting the standard is not passing, it is not failing, anything above that level is where the passing marks appear. Linking increased spending with a concomitant decrease in American commitments will also help sell the European case e.g. NATO is doing X so America can do less of X.
Europe’s efforts must also be clearly and directly connected to America’s desired rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific — the more strategically important of the theatres. The more NATO member-states demonstrate they are increasingly responsible for their own security in Europe, the more enabling it is of America’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific.
Equally, the more NATO member-states can show they are supportive of and recognize the strategic threat from China, the better. Doing more at home, enabling America to do more in the Indo-Pacific, and being more supportive of that theatre—even rhetorically — will help make the case for Trump in Europe.
The messaging effort must also look beyond President Trump and to Congress more broadly. There remains a large contingent of supporters of Ukraine in the incoming House and Senate. Trump may inherit an “imperial presidency,” but that does not mean the legislature is without voice or involvement in national security and foreign policy.
The American people are, here, important too. When it is explained, Americans understand why Ukraine and Europe matters to them and their prosperity. The problem is that Biden’s administration abandoned its efforts to communicate Ukraine (and most other issues) to small-town America. This must change if America is to continue supporting Ukraine and Europe.
There is no guarantee, of course, that these messaging efforts are successful — will Trump have a Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) moment, where he enters office, receives the briefs, and changes his mind? Likely not, but that does not mean it is without hope.
The desire to end the war is noble but ending it on favorable terms for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine, whilst avoiding the risks of escalation must drive policy — not just the naked pursuit of an end.
Joshua C. Huminski is senior vice president for National Security and Intelligence Programs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress and a George Mason University National Security Institute senior fellow.
